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Capabilities of
Military ~~Force~~ Turkey-Greece-Cyprus

Turkey has a clear superiority in the air for operations against Cyprus, not only because of numerical superiority in tactical fighter and fighter^t/bomber aircraft (approximately 380 of all types against Greece's 245 or so) but because of the nearness of the main TAF field at Incirlik, near Adana, to Cyprus (175 miles as opposed to the nearest Greek base at Souda Bay on Crete--360 miles). This would give the TAF air control over Cyprus from the outset, and would seriously hamper RHAFF efforts to interdict Turkish amphibious operations across the 40 miles that separates Cyprus from the Turkish mainland.

On the ground, Turkish forces in Thrace are at a high state of combat readiness, and are relatively heavy^{*} in armor, for which the local terrain is well suited. Turkish armored and infantry elements now reportedly assembled in the Corlu area are in a position to launch a drive along the coastal road into Greece through Alexandropolis and Kavalla toward Thessaloniki. Available information suggests that the opposing Greek forces are deployed defensively, and that they are bringing POL forward from the Athens area. The Turkish strategy would probably be to launch an amphibious assault with one infantry division (the 39th, part of which was seen moving toward the port of Mersin on the evening of 18 November), while tying down the bulk of the Greek forces with a simultaneous drive into Greek Thrace. Turkey would have air and ground superiority in both theaters, although its air superiority would

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be less preponderant in the Thrace operation.

Turkish and Greek naval forces are roughly comparable in combat readiness, with perhaps a slight edge going to the Greek Navy. Turkey has improved its amphibious capability significantly since the 1964 crisis, but even though it might be able to land a sizeable force (elements, and perhaps all of the 39th Division, minus some heavy equipment within a few days) it would experience difficulties in maintaining this size force on Cyprus for an extended period, even if Greek action against its supply lines were ineffective.

On Cyprus itself, the Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces have the capability of wiping out many, and perhaps most, of the Turkish-Cypriot communities before Turkish forces could intervene. The 3 to 1 numerical superiority of the Greek/Greek Cypriot side over their opponents only tells part of the story, since the Turkish side (apart from the 650 man Turkish Army contingent) is made up of poorly trained and inadequately armed irregulars trying to hold onto fixed defensive positions isolated from each other.

By employing their 40 operational C-47's and 5 C-130's the Turks would be able to deliver over 1300 troops of their commando brigade on Cyprus within less than 4 hours of the receiving the order. By using both C-47's and C-130's the entire commando brigade could be air lifted to Cyprus within 4 hours after the first drop. It is more likely, however, that they would use the C-130's for moving equipment. This would mean

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that the commando brigade could be moved to Cyprus by air within 12 hours of the receipt of the order. It is likely that their would be some aircraft lost to AA fire, particularly from among the C-130's, and that some the air dropped supplies and equipment would be damaged.

GREECE		TURKEY	
<u>Military Manpower</u>		<u>Military Manpower</u>	
Ground Forces	115,000	Ground Forces	376,000
Air Forces	23,000	Air Forces	42,000
Naval Forces	17,000	Naval Forces	39,000
<u>Military Aircraft</u>		<u>Military Aircraft</u>	
Fighter Aircraft	245	Fighter Aircraft	380
Transport Aircraft (C-47)	29	Transport Aircraft (C-47)	42
(C-130)	---	(C-130)	5
<u>Tanks</u>		<u>Tanks</u>	
Light	145	Light	238
Medium	558	Medium	1,282
APCs	757	APCs	168

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